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Abstract
For general design basis accidents, such as SBLOCA and 
LBLOCA, the traditional deterministic safety analysis methodologies are 
always applied to analyze events based on a so called surrogate or licensing 
sequence, without considering how low this sequence occurrence probability
is. In the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a, the LBLOCA will be categorized as 
accidents beyond design basis and the PCT margin shall be evaluated in a 
risk-informed manner. According to the risk-informed safety margin 
characterization (RISMC) methodology, a process has been suggested to 
evaluate the risk-informed PCT margin. Following the RISMC methodology,
a load spectrum of PCT for LBLOCA has been generated for the Taiwan’s 
Maanshan Nuclear Power plant and 14 probabilistic significant sequences 
have been identified.
It was observed in the load spectrum that the conditional PCT generally ascends with
the descending sequence occurrence probability. With the load spectrum covering 
both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, the risk-informed PCT margin can be 
evaluated by either expecting value estimation method or sequence probability 
coverage method. It was found that by comparing with the traditional deterministic 
methodology, the PCT margin evaluated by the RISMC methodology can be greater
by 44-62 K. Besides, to have a cumulated occurrence probability over 99% in the load
spectrum, the occurrence probability of the sequence referred is about 5.07*10-3, 
whereas for the traditional surrogate or licensing sequence generally applied in the 
deterministic methodology, the occurrence probability is only about 5.46*10-5.
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Probabilistic, RISMC Methodology
The number of manuscript folios: 37, including 9 figures and 3 tables
31. Introduction
A traditional deterministic safety analysis methodology is generally applied to 
analyze design basis accidents (DBA) based on a so called surrogate or licensing 
sequence, without considering how low this sequence occurrence probability is. 
Although the occurrence probability of such licensing sequence generally is lower,
it do satisfy all required conservative assumptions for DBA licensing analysis,
such as single-failure criteria, loss of off-site power, et al.. In traditional licensing
safety analysis, other than the chosen surrogate sequence, calculation uncertainty 
also needs to be considered, which involves both model uncertainty and plant 
status uncertainty. By proper consideration of these two uncertainties (IAEA,
2003), calculation uncertainty can be well quantified. In general, these two types
of uncertainties can be categorized as epistemic uncertainty. Traditionally, only 
conservative Appendix K methodology is allow to perform LBLOCA licensing 
analysis. Whereas, in the revised 10 CFR 50.46 (USNRC, 1988), best estimate 
plus uncertainty (BEPU) has been allowed and regulatory guide 1.157 (USNRC,
1989) clearly states how to quantify associated calculation uncertainty. Although
BEPU methodology (Boyack, et al., 1989) is legally allowed to replace 
conservative Appendix K methodology (USNRC, 1974), it is still a revised 
deterministic methodology based on a predetermined licensing sequence.
In general, all uncertainties can be categorized into epistemic uncertainty and
aleatory uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty results from the “imperfect knowledge”
regarding values of parameters of the underlying computational model, whereas 
aleatory uncertainty results from the effect of “inherent randomness” or
“stochastic variability”. Aleatory uncertainty represents the nondeterministic and 
unpredictable random nature of the performance of the system and its components.
In the current advanced BEPU licensing safety analysis methodologies 
(Westinghouse, 2005) (Martin, R.P., 2005) (Framatome ANP, 2001), only
epistemic uncertainty is considered which involves both best-estimate mechanistic
models and realistic plan status parameters. On the contrary to a surrogate 
sequence generally applied in traditional deterministic methodologies, to dealing 
with the aleatory uncertainty, a group of sequences should be identified for a 
particular initiating event with PSA skill (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981) to take 
into account systems or components failure by random probability.
In the current 10 CFR 50.46, both SBLOCA and LBLOCA are considered as 
design basis accidents, and only deterministic methodologies based on a 
conservative surrogate or licensing sequence are granted for LOCA licensing 
safety analysis. However, as stated in the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a (USNRC,
2010a ), “alternative acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for
light water nuclear power reactors”, any LOCAs with break size greater than the
transition break size (USNRC, 2010b) can be considered as accidents beyond the 
design basis. It was also stated in the paragraph (e) (3) of 10 CFR 50.46a, 
calculations for LBLOCA may take credit for the availability of offsite power and
do not require the assumption of a single failure. Besides, Realistic initial 
conditions and availability of safety-related and non-safety-related equipment
may be assumed if supported by plant-specific data or analysis.
As also stated in the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a, any applicant, permit holder, 
or licensee or other entity who wishes to make changes enabled by this new rule, 
to the facility, facility design, or procedures or to the technical specifications shall 
perform a risk-informed evaluation. According to the 10 CFR 50.46a, the
risk-informed assessment process must include methods for evaluating 
compliance with the risk criteria, defense-in-depth criteria, safety margin criteria,
and performance measurement criteria. As required, when evaluating the
risk-informed safety margin, uncertainties considered should include 
phenomenology, modeling, plant construction, plant operation, etc. (USNRC,
2010c). The risk-informed safety margin therefore refers to a view of margin
based on a broader perspective compared to the safety margin determined by
traditional deterministic LOCA methodologies. Therefore, according to the
proposed 10 CFR 50.46a, statements about margin now need to have meaning not
only with respect to a design-basis event sequence, but more generally with 
reference to a non design-basis sequence, or even group of sequences: a success
path or a family of success paths. The newly developed risk-informed safety 
margin characteristic (RISMC) methodology (Hess, 2009) (Smith, et al., 2012) 
(Kang, et al., 2013) (Sherry, et al., 2013) can be applied to calculate the
risk-informed safety margin for LBLOCA to satisfy the to-be-issued 10 CFR
50.46a.
The RISMC methodology is a systematic approach to consider both aleatory 
and epistemic uncertainties. To replace the surrogate-based decision making, the 
main scope of the RISMC methodology is to generate a probabilistic load spectra
as shown in Figure 1, and quantify the safety margin in a proper risk-informed 
manner. The RISMC methodology systematically combines both probabilistic 
and mechanistic approaches to estimate the safety margin. The probability 
analysis is represented by the stochastic risk analysis with PSA techniques 
involving both event tree and fault tree analysis, whereas mechanistic analysis is 
represented by the physical calculation with evaluation models satisfying 
requirements set forth in the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a. Evaluation models can 
be either conservative Appendix K model or realistic models with uncertainty
quantification. With the combination of both probabilistic and mechanistic
analyses, both aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty can be well 
quantitatively addressed, and a risk-informed peak cladding temperature (PCT)
margin of LBLOCA can be evaluated.
2.   Process to Evaluate the Risk-Informed PCT Margin with RISMC
Methodology
To perform risk-informed LBLOCA analysis with the RISMC methodology, a 
load spectrum of LBLOCA will be generated and both aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties will be quantified. The following process was recommended to 
calculate the licensing PCT of a LBLOCA to satisfy the risk-informed safety 
margin evaluation requirement stated in the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a.
(1) Identification of the LBLOCA Sequences
With the probabilistic safety assessment techniques (Kumamoto & Henley,
1996), possible scenarios or sequences of LBLOCA will be identified. 
(2) Quantification of LBLOCA sequence occurrence probabilities
To address the aleatory uncertainty, the occurrence probability of each 
sequence (sequence probability, SP) will be quantified by both event tree and 
fault tree analysis and consequently, probabilistic significant sequences can be
identified.
(3) Calculation of the nominal PCT for LBLOCA sequences
As required by the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a, a proper evaluation model 
which meets the requirement of traditional LBLOCA licensing calculation 
shall be applied to perform LBLOCA analysis with nominal settings of both
models and plant parameters to calculate the nominal conditional peak
cladding temperature (CPCT) for each probabilistic significant LBLOCA
sequence. 
(4) Conducting a preliminary load spectrum of LBLOCA
By having the CPCT of each probabilistically significant scenarios or 
sequences and associated sequence probability, a preliminary load spectrum of
LBLOCA can be conducted;
(5) Quantification of calculation uncertainty of the preliminary load spectrum 
To account for the epistemic or calculation uncertainty of CPCT resulting 
from physical models and plant status for the preliminary load spectrum, the
CPCT at 95% coverage and 95% confidence level (CPCT95/95) will be
calculated with proper methodology (Westinghouse, 2005) (Liang, et al., 2011)
(Ludmann, M., 1999) on the traditional surrogate or licensing sequence, and
quantify the difference between the CPCT95/95 and the nominal CPCT
calculated in step (3) on the surrogate sequence:Δ
PCTun,ss   CPCT95 / 95,ss   CPCT
,ss
(1)
(6) Conducting the final load spectrum for LBLOCA
With the calculation uncertainty (PCTun,ss) evaluated on the surrogate 
sequence, the preliminary load spectrum of LBLOCA will be shifted, as
shown in Figure 2, to reflect the calculation uncertainty, instead of calculating
the CPCT95/95 for each sequence. Therefore, the final CPCT for sequence “i”
will be:
CPCT   ,i   CPCT ,i   
PCTun,ss
(2)
and the PCT margin of sequence “i” can then be calculated as:
PCTSM ,i   PCTSL    PCT 
,i
(3)
Where PCTSL is the safety limit required by the regulation and generally is
1477.5K (2200.0oF).
(7) The Risk-informed PCT Safety Margin Characterization
The risk-informed PCT safety margin (PCTRI) can be calculated by two 
different methods; the first one is the expecting value estimation method and
the second one is the sequence probability coverage method. In the first 
method, the risk-informed safety margin can be mathematically defined as
(Gavrilas, M., et al., 2007):
 PCTSM ,i * SPi
PCT      i                                             RI SP (4) i
i
Note that when PCTSM,i of any sequence “i” is less than 0.0, it will be set as
shown in Figure 2, to reflect the calculation uncertainty, instead of calculating
0.0 to reflect the fact that the risk-informed safety margin of PCT can only be 
contributed by those sequence with positive PCTSM,i. Moreover, note that the
summation of total sequence probability is equal to unity.
Alternatively, in the second sequence probability coverage method, the
risk-informed peak cladding temperature (PCT  99%) will be defined by a
particular sequence with a cumulated occurrence probability greater than 99%.
Therefore, the PCT  99% of the second method can be defined by the final
CPCT of sequence K:
PCT 99%  CPCT ,k (5)
Where the sequence “K” is determined by the summation of all the sequence
probabilities (SP1-k) from the sequence with the lowest CPCT, i by
ascending order until the SP1-k is greater than 99%.
k
SP1k    SPi   99% , 
with
i 1
CPCT   ,i   CPCT  
,k
(6)
Therefore, by the second sequence probability coverage method, the
risk-informed safety PCT margin will be:
PCT  PCT  PCT 99% (7)
The above seven major steps were summarized in Figure 3 for illustration. In 
the following sections, the Taiwan’s Maanshan PWR plant (Westinghouse, 1987) 
was referred to demonstrate how to evaluate the risk-informed PCT safety margin
for LBLOCAs.
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3.   LBLOCA sequences identification and quantification
According to the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a, LBLOCA will be considered as 
beyond design basis accidents and traditional deterministic licensing sequence can
be relaxed. Therefore, to address the effect of system and component random 
failure caused by aleatory uncertainty, with probability and risk assessment 
techniques all possible LBLOCA sequences will be identified and the occurrence 
probability of each sequence (sequence probability, SP) can be quantified. In the 
short term LBLOCA PCT analysis, possible sequences were configured by the 
random combination of the individual safety injection system available.
Considering Taiwan’s Maanshan nuclear plant, a traditional 3-loop 
Westinghouse PWR, emergence core cooling system (ECCS) includes high head
injection system, low head injection system and accumulators for medium head 
injection. All above safety systems satisfy the single failure criteria and 
redundancy criteria. Therefore, in the headings of the event tree analysis, all
possible system combinations are considered and consequently 108 different event
sequences are degenerated. With appropriate fault tree analysis, the occurrence 
probability of each sequence can be well quantified. The possible system 
combination of each sequence is shown in the LBLOCA event tree plot (Figure 4) 
and occurrence probabilities of the top fourteen probabilistic significant LBLOCA
13
sequences are summarized in Table 1.
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4. Probabilistic Load Spectrum of LBLOCA
As indicated in section 3, fourteen probabilistic significant sequences of 
LBLOCA of Taiwan’s Maanshan nuclear power plant have been identified, as 
listed in Table 1. The total occurrence probability of those fourteen probabilistic 
significant sequences is more than 99.99% coverage. To generate a load spectrum 
for the LBLOCA while considering both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, a 
two-step approach was adopted as elaborated in section 2. The first step is to 
generate a preliminary load spectrum by using RELAP5-3D/K (Liang, K.S., et al.,
2002a) (Liang, K.S., et al., 2002b) to calculate the nominal conditional PCT 
(CPCT) for each sequence, and the second step is to account for the epistemic or 
calculation uncertainty of the preliminary load spectrum by using the DRHM
methodology (Liang, K.S., 2011). In the DRHM methodology, conservative 
Appendix K models were adopted to cover model uncertainty, whereas realistic
plant status parameters were used with statistical uncertainty analysis.
To calculate the CPCT of those probabilistic significant sequences in the first 
step, all the plant status parameters are set as their nominal values, and a 
conservative plant model for Maanshan LBLOCA analysis (Taiwan Power
Company, 2013) is applied, as shown in Figure 5. The CPCT of the top fourteen
probabilistic significant LBLOCA sequences were calculated and the associated
responses are shown in Figure 6. Moreover, the resulted CPCT of each
probabilistic significant sequence are also summarized in Table 1 and a plot of 
CPCT versus associated sequence probability is shown in Figure 7 to represent 
the preliminary LBLOCA load spectrum of the Maanshan nuclear power plant. It
can be observed from the preliminary load spectrum that the CPCTgenerally
ascends with the descending sequence occurrence probability.
To account for the calculation uncertainty in the second step with DRHM 
methodology, since conservative Appendix evaluation model (RELAP5-3D/K) is 
applied, the remaining calculation uncertainty will be the plant status uncertainties. 
The effect of the plant status uncertainty on PCT calculation was evaluated on the 
basis of the traditional licensing sequence (sequence LOCAS74 in Table 1). 
Referring to a typical PWR best estimate LBLOCA licensing analysis 
(Westinghouse, 2009), important plant parameters were identified and
summarized in Table 2 with uncertainty ranges. According to the DRHM 
methodology, at least 59 trials were randomly generated to quantify the effect of 
plant status uncertainty. Typical parameter samplings are shown in Figure 8 for 
illustration and the PCT responses of 59 trials are also shown in Figure 9. By the 
Wilk’s formula (David and Nagaraja, 1980), the PCT of 95% percentile and 95% 
confidence level can be estimated by the highest PCT amount those 59 trials,
which is 1337.76 K. With the nominal PCT value of 1289.46 K (CPCT,ss) and
95/95 PCT value of 1337.76 K(CPCT95/95,ss) evaluated on the licensing sequence, 
the calculation uncertainty according to Equation (1) caused by plant status
uncertainty can be quantified as:
PCTun,ss   CPCT95 / 95,ss   CPCT
,ss
(8)
=48.3 K
Accordingly, the preliminary load spectrum will be shifted by 48.3 K
CPCT   ,i   CPCT ,i   
48.3K
(9)
to reflect the calculation uncertainty. The final CPCT of those fourteen 
probabilistic significant sequences with calculation uncertainty are listed in the
last column in Table 1.
5 Risk-Informed PCT Safety Margin Characterization
With the final load spectrum for LBLOCA as indicated in the last column of 
Table 1, the risk-informed PCT safety margin (PCTRI) can be calculated by two
different methods; the first one is the expecting value estimation method and the
second one is the sequence probability coverage method. By using the first 
expecting value estimation method and data listed in Table 1, the risk-informed
safety margin can be mathematically calculated according to Equation (4) as
follows:
PCTRI    PCTMR,i 
*SPi
i
(10)
= 202.1 KΣ
As for the second sequence probability coverage method, it was found that the
summation of the first 3 sequence (LOCAS01, LOCAS55 and LOCAS56) 
probabilities is 99.3%. Therefore, the third sequence with a value of 1293.42 K
99%will be applied to define the risk-informed PCTRI , and the risk-informed safety
margin will be as follows
PCT  PCT  PCT 99% (11)
= 184.2 K
RI LS RI
5 Risk-Informed PCT Safety Margin Characterization
Comparing the risk-informed safety margins evaluated by above two methods, it
can be found that the PCTRI calculated by the sequence probability coverage
method is reasonably conservative by 17.92 K. Because the occurrence probability
was dominated by the first five sequences, it was expected that the risk-informed
PCT safety margin evaluated by either the expecting value estimation method or 
the sequence probability coverage method should not have a significant 
difference.
It was observed in the Table 1 that in the second sequence probability
coverage method, the third sequence (LOCAS56) was applied to define the
99%risk-informed safety margin (PCTRI ) and its’ associated occurrence
probability is 5.07*10-3, while the occurrence probability of the traditional 
licensing sequence (LOCAS74) applied in the classical deterministic methodology 
is only 5.46*10-5. In the traditional licensing sequence (LOCAS74) only one train 
of high head and low head injection are available respectively to satisfy single
failure criteria. While in sequence referred in the evaluation of risk-informed PCT
safety margin ( LOCAS56) to cover 99% cumulated occurrence probability, there 
are two trains of high head injection and one train of low head injection available 
instead. The detailed differences of the first three sequences and the traditional 
surrogate sequence are summarized in Table 3.
It was also noted that according to the deterministic methodology, the
licensing PCT can only be evaluated by the traditional surrogate sequence
(LOCAS74) and the correspondent value is 1337.76 K as indicated in Table 1.
Consequently, the traditional deterministic safety margin is only 139.74 K by 
applying the DRHM methodology. Therefore, the PCT safety margin of LBLOCA
evaluated by the RISMC methodology can be greater by 44.4-62.4 K than the 
margin evaluated by the DRHM deterministic methodology.
6 Conclusions
According to the to-be-issued 10 CFR 50.46a, the LBLOCA will be 
categorized as accidents beyond design basis. Therefore, the risk-informed safety
margin characterization (RISMC) methodology has been applied to evaluate the 
PCT margin in a risk-informed manner for LBLOCA of Taiwan’s Maanshan 
PWR plant. By following the proposed process to evaluate risk-informed PCT 
margin, it can be concluded that:
(1) all possible LBLOCA sequences have been conducted by applying traditional
PSA technology, 14 probabilistic dominant sequences have been identified 
and associated occurrence probabilities also have been quantified;
(2) a load spectrum for LBLOCA has been conducted by calculating conditional 
PCT of each probabilistic significant sequence with proper LOCA evaluation 
models. Generally the conditional PCT ascends with the descending sequence
occurrence probability. In this load spectrum both aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties have been considered;
(3) with the load spectrum, the risk-informed PCT can be evaluated by either the
expecting value estimation method or the sequence probability coverage 
method. The risk-informed PCT safety margin was evaluated ranging from
184.2-202.1 K;
(4) By comparing with the DRHM deterministic methodology, the PCT margin
evaluated by the RISMC methodology can be greater by 44.4-62.4 K by using
the same LBLOCA evaluation model(RELAP5-3D/K); and
(5) In the RISMC methodology, to have a cumulated occurrence probability over
99% in the load spectrum, the occurrence probability of the sequence referred
in the sequence probability coverage method is 5.07*10-3. While in the 
deterministic methodology, the occurrence probability of the traditional 
surrogate or licensing sequence is only 5.46*10-5. The traditional licensing 
sequence can only have one train of safety injection system to satisfy single
failure criteria, while in sequence referred to evaluate the risk-informed PCT
safety margin, there are two trains of high head injection and one train of low
head injection are available instead.
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Table 1. Summary of the Top 14 Probabilistic Significant LBLOCA Sequences
Sequence Occurrence Probability CPCT (K) CPCT (K)
LOCAS01 4.946E-01 1224.36 1272.66
LOCAS55 4.935E-01 1229.52 1277.82
LOCAS56 5.067E-03 1245.12 1293.42
LOCAS91 4.522E-05 1263.21 1311.51
LOCAS73 1.252E-03 1264.37 1312.67
LOCAS02 5.087E-03 1276.48 1324.78
LOCAS58 1.322E-05 1278.05 1326.35
LOCAS19 1.070E-04 1287.59 1335.89
LOCAS37 4.522E-05 1289.01 1337.31
LOCAS74 5.460E-05 1289.46 1337.76
LOCAS20 5.692E-05 1293.70 1342.00
LOCAS04 1.322E-05 1331.42 1379.72
LOCAS07 2.644E-05 1429.63 1477.93
LOCAS61 2.644E-05 1499.76 1548.06
Table 2. Uncertainties of Major Plant Parameters of Typical PWRs
Parameters Distribution Min Max
Core thermal power Uniform 101.38% 102%
Initial average fluid
temperature (Tavg),K
Uniform 579.71 584.15
Pressurizer pressure (PRCS),
kpa
Uniform 15168.47 15857.94
Accumulator liquid volume
(VACC), m
3
Uniform 27.89 28.74
Accumulator pressure
(PACC), kpa
Uniform 4357.49 4688.44
Accumulator temperature
(TACC), K
Uniform 310.93 338.71
Safety injection
temperature (TSI),
Uniform 282.59 322.04
Peak heat flux hot channel
factor (FQ)
Uniform (2.137±0.137)
& normal (σ=2.6%)
2.000-4σ 2.274+4σ
Peak hot rod enthalpy rise
hot channel factor (F△H)
Normal (mean=1.65,
σ=2.43%)
Mean-4σ Mean+4σ
Axial power distribution
(PBOT)
Uniform 0.22 0.44
Axial power distribution
(PMID)
Uniform 0.31 0.43
Off-site power Random Loop Non-loop
Table 2. Uncertainties of Major Plant Parameters of Typical PWRs
Sequence
ID
Sequence 
probability
Loss of
off-site
power
High
Head
Injection
ACC 
Injection
Low 
Pressure 
Injection
LOCAS01 4.946E-01 no 2 trains 3 2 trains
LOCAS55 4.935E-01 yes 2 trains 3 2 trains
LOCAS56 5.067E-03 yes 2 trains 3 1 train
LOCAS74 5.460E-05 yes 1 train 3 1 train
Figure 1. Load Spectrum (Hess, 2009)
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Figure 2. Shifted Load Spectrum to Reflect Calculation Uncertainty
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Figure 3. Process for Risk-informed PCT Safety Margin Evaluation
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Figure 4. Sequence Identification and Quantification for LBLOCA
Figure 5. RELAP5 Nodding Diagram for Maanshan PWR LBLOCA Analysis
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Figure 6. CPCT Responses for the Probabilistic Significant LBOCA Events
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Figure 7. Preliminary Load Spectrum for Maanshan PWR LBLOCA
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Figure 8. Typical Parameter Samplings
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Figure 9. Calculated PCT of 59 Trials
